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Abstract  
The statistical enhancement of administrative data sources has 
played a pivotal role in the analysis of the labor market in the 
last decades. They permit us to obtain a clearer picture of the 
reality than the common surveys. In so doing, they represent a 
cognitive instrument capable to support the decision-making  
strategies adequately and timely.  
This PhD thesis provides two case studies in this d irection. Using 
unique administrative datasets for Italy, we deal with two 
important labor market issues.  
In the first part, we investigate the impact of employment 
protection on the composition of the workforce and worker 
turnover. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main existing 
literature about the effect of EP on labor market.  
In Chapter 2, using a novel matched employer-employee 
administrative dataset, w e adopt a regression d iscontinuity 
design (RDD) that exploits the variation in employment 
protection provisions in Italy between firms below 15 employees 
and those above 15 employees. Our newly dataset allows us to 
better identify the size of firms and most importantly the 
d ifferent typologies of labor contracts.  
In order to justify the use of the RDD approach we conduct three 
d ifferent tests. First, we show that firm -size density is actually 
continuous around the threshold , as proposed in McCrary 
(2008). Second, we follow Schivardi and  Torrini (2008) and assess 
whether firms just below and above the threshold  d iffer in their 
propensity to grow. Finally, we conduct a series of balancing 
tests to investigate to what exten t firms just above and below the 
threshold  d iffer in terms of the observable characteristics.  
Our RDD estimates suggest that EP increases worker 
reallocation, suggesting that EP tend s to reduce rather to 
increase worker security. This can be explained  by the fact that 
firms facing more stringent EP make a greater use of workers on 
fixed-term contracts. Indeed, the incidence of temporary work is 
2-2.5 percentage points higher in larger firms. There is also 
evidence that EP reduces labor productivity. This effect is to an 
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important extent due to the impact of EP on worker reallocation 
and the incidence of temporary work.  
In the second part, we investigate the effect of the final 
graduation mark on the graduates‟ probability to be hired  by 
firms (Chapter 3). The analysis is based  on a worker-level 
administrative dataset. By evaluating employment contracts on 
the basis of their expected  duration, we estimate multilevel logit 
and  multilevel ordered  logit models to take into account the 
clustered  structure of the data and the nature of the response 
variables.  
Using a random intercept and  a random slope specifications, we 
find  the existence of a non-trivial effect of the graduation mark 
on the probability to be hired , even after controlling for the 
problem of selection. Specifically, the effect is non-monotonic: it 
is positive below a certain threshold , and  it becomes negative 
afterwards. In case of permanent contracts, the effect of the 
graduation mark is not significant, while the major chosen by the 
student plays a key role. 
     
1 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2010, the Economist defined  the increasing availability of 
information produced daily and its flow in all the areas of 
economic activity as data deluge. This information represents a 
powerful source of knowledge extraordinarily important that 
can affect the strategies of firms and public decisions 
significantly.  
In this context, the statistical enhancement of data collected for 
administrative purposes has acquired  a pivotal role in the last 
decades. This is particularly true in the public sector. This kind 
of data permits us to obtain a picture of the reality which is 
complementary to that of common surveys. As a result, they 
represent a cognitive instrument capable to support the decision -
making strategies adequately and timely.   
My research provides two case studies in this d irection. We deal 
with two important labor market issues by usin g unique 
employer-employee administrative datasets for Italy which have  
never been used  before. Particularly, the use of the New 
Informative System of Compulsory Communications represents 
an absolute novelty. Introduced by the Ministerial Decree of 
October 30, 2007 this Informative System records each workforce 
movement in private and public Italian firms. Moreover, for each 
worker movement, it provides a rich set of information about 
workers and firms‟ characteristics.  
In the first case study, we investigate the impact of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) on the composition of the workforce 
and worker turnover. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the 
main existing literature about the effect of EPL on labor market, 
assessing what economic theory predicts and  what is observed 
through the empirical analysis. Particularly, we have examined 
the relationship between the EPL and the stock of employment, 
worker flows to and from unemployment, the duration of 
unemployment and productivity. Theoretical and  empirical 
research seem to converge on the following results: more 
stringent regulations reduce personnel turnover and job 
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reallocation, while they increase the duration of unemployment. 
Conversely, the effect on the aggregate employment and 
unemployment is hard  to grasp.  
Finally, the EPL may affect productivity d irectly and indirectly 
through several channels. By reducing firms‟ ability to respond 
to the exogenous shock of demand and technological changes in 
a suitable manner, the EPL may have a negative effect on 
productivity. In ad dition it may lower worker effort. But 
stringent regulation safeguarding the long-term employment 
relationship may improve work intensity, making firms and 
workers more likely to invest in human capital with a 
consequent positive effect on  the productivity. 
In Chapter 2, co-authored  with Stefano Scarpetta and  Alexander 
Hijzen (OECD and IZA, France), using a novel matched 
employer-employee administrative dataset, we adopt a 
regression d iscontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the variation 
in employment protection provisions in Italy between firms 
below 15 employees and those above 15 employees. Our newly 
dataset allows us to better identify the size of firms and most 
importantly the d ifferent typologies of labor contracts.  
In order to justify the use of the RDD approach we conduct three 
d ifferent tests. First, we show that firm -size density is actually 
continuous around the threshold , as proposed in McCrary 
(2008). Second, we follow Schivardi and  Torrini (2008) and assess 
whether firms just below and above the threshold  d iffer in their 
propensity to grow. Finally, we conduct a series of balancing 
tests to investigate to what extent firms just above and below the 
threshold  d iffer in terms of the observable characteristics.  
Our RDD estimates suggest that EP increases worker 
reallocation, suggesting that EP tend s to reduce rather to 
increase worker security. This can be explained  by the fact that 
firms facing more stringent EP make a greater use of workers on 
fixed-term contracts. Indeed, the incidence of temporary work is 
2-2.5 percentage points higher in larger firms. There is also 
evidence that EP reduces labor productivity. This effect is to an 
important extent due to the impact of EP on worker reallocation 
and the incidence of temporary work.  
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In the second case study, we explore the effect of the final 
graduation mark on the graduates‟ probability to be hired  by 
firms (Chapter 3). The analysis is based  on a worker-level 
administrative dataset. By evaluating employment contracts on 
the basis of their expected  duration, we estimate multilevel logit 
and  multilevel ordered  logit models to take into account the 
clustered  structure of the data and the nature of the response 
variables.  
Using a random intercept and  a random slope sp ecifications, we 
find  the existence of a non-trivial effect of the graduation mark 
on the probability to be hired , even after controlling for the 
problem of selection. Specifically, the effect is non -monotonic: it 
is positive below a certain threshold , and  it becomes negative 
afterwards. In case of permanent contracts, the effect of the 
graduation mark is not significant, while the major chosen by the 
student plays a key role. 
 
 
  
4 
 
Chapter 1. The effect of EPL on the labor market: 
theoretical models and empirical evidence.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The employment protection legislation (EPL) is generally 
justified  by certain recurring factors: the need  to protect workers 
from unfair behavior of their employers, the fact that 
imperfections in financial markets limit workers‟ ability to insure 
themselves against the risk of d ismissal and  the need  to preserve 
the firm-specific human capital by preventing the destruction of 
jobs that are viable in the long-term (Hijzen et al, 2013).  
To achieve this aim, the EPL introduces rules that define the 
limits within which firms could  hire or lay off workers. In  case of 
permanent contracts, EPL defines the conditions under which an 
individual or collective d ismissal are permitted . It also regula tes 
the use of fixed -term or temporary work agency contracts and 
their duration (Martin and Scarpetta, 2012). In this regard , it 
regulates the terms under which these can be offered , the 
maximum number of successive renewals and  the maximum 
cumulative duration.  
All such limitations raise the overall costs to ad just the size and  
composition of the workforce, thus constraining firms‟ capacity 
to respond to the changes in technology and market demand 
adequately and timely. This may have negative effects on a more 
efficient allocation of personnel to optimize production and on 
the growth of productivity (Martin and Scarpetta, 2012). From a 
macroeconomic perspective, these adjustment costs may 
influence the overall welfare and the national finances, by 
affecting employment and  unemployment levels, structural 
changes, wage, productivity and growth (Skedinger, 2010).  
Furthermore, these costs may show very high variability. Indeed, 
several components such as the implementation and  
enforcement of the law (i.e. how law works practically) make the 
picture of the EPL legislative context harder to define. In this 
regard , Venn (2009) and Bassanini et al. (2008) stress the 
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importance of the interpretation of the rules by the courts and  
the effectiveness of the EPL enforcement in the evaluation of its 
impact. Ichino et al (2003) and Bertola et al (2000) argue that the 
state of the economy influences the court‟s decisions. More 
specifically, judges decide in favor of the workers when the 
economic conditions are characterized  by high unemployment 
levels. This increases considerably the d ismissal cost for firms 
operating in economically depressed  areas. In a similar manner, 
Marinescu (2008) shows that in the UK judges are more likely to 
decide in favor of the employee if the unemployment is high, but 
only if the d ismissed  employee is still unemployed during the 
trial. As a matter of fact, if the employee has found another job, 
the macroeconomic conditions and the unemployment do not 
play any role. Okudaira et al (2011) provide an empirical 
evaluation of the EPL on productivity of firms, by exploiting the 
variations in the enforcement of the law across the Japanese 
regions. They find  that strict enforcement of employment 
protection by courts may have a significant impact thus to 
reduce the total factor productivity as well as the labor 
productivity of firms.   
The main objective of this paper is to provide a literature review 
about the effect of the EPL on the labor market, by assessing 
what economic theory predicts and  what is observed through the 
empirical analysis. Specifically, we will examine the relationship 
between the EPL and the stock of employment, the worker flows 
to and from unemployment, the duration of unemployment and 
productivity. 
The paper is organized  as follows. The first section describes the 
main legislative characteristics of the EPL, by introducing some 
of the most comprehensive EPL measurement indices in the 
literature.  
The second section provides a review of the theoretical results. 
First we follow Laezer (1990) and show that if wages are 
perfectly flexible, the effect of the EPL is completely neutralized . 
Then, we follow Schivardi (1999) and observe that in a context 
with rigid  wages, the EPL is inefficient. Other theoretical 
predictions about the effect of the employment protection on 
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aggregate employment, labor reallocation and productivity are 
further provided.  
In the third  section, we examine the main empirical evid ence 
emerging from the literature. While there is a substantial 
convergence on the effect of the EPL on the employment flows, 
there is no consensus about the overall impact of the EPL on the 
employment and unemployment stocks. Finally, stringent rules 
on hires and firings could  affect the efficiency of production and  
the growth of productivity through several channels (OECD, 
2007). The fourth paragraph is the conclusion. 
 
1.2 The EPL and the measurement.   
 
The objective of this paragraph is to provide an adequate 
background to the main economic implications of the EPL on the 
labor market. In order to achieve this aim, we describe the main 
legislative characteristics of the EPL. One way to get a summary 
view of these characteristics is to introduce and show in details 
some of the most comprehensive EPL measurement indices in 
the literature. Indeed, these indices consider the legislation in its 
entirety by assigning weights to its various components 
(Skedinger, 2010).  
Several authors (Heckman; Pages, 2004) and institutions (OECD, 
World  Bank) have identified  EPL measurement indices. The 
OECD –  index is the most widely used  in the literature. It was 
introduced in the early 1990s (Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD, 
1999, 2004, 2009) and has been revised  recently (Venn, 2009). This 
index is defined  from 21 items. Each of these items is assigned  a 
score which takes into account the level of stringency of the labor 
market regulation. They refer to the main areas of the job 
protection regulation: that regarding the costs an d  procedures of 
individual and  collective d ismissals of permanent workers, that 
concerning the hiring of workers on fixed -term and that 
regarding the temporary work agency contracts. Each of these 
areas contributes d ifferently to the determination of the overall 
level of stringency and protection of the labor market. The 
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different contributions are measured  through a system of 
weights. 
Regarding the laying off of permanent workers, the index 
examines 9 items related to the possible difficulties inherent the  
procedures involved in d ismissing individuals or groups of 
workers. For instance, the modalities of notification procedure 
are considered . The strictness score in this case may vary from 
the lowest value, when the oral statement is enough , to the 
highest value, when this notification should  be necessarily 
authorized  by a third  party. The other variables analyzed in this 
section are the length of the trial period , the stringency of the 
definition of unfair d ismissal and  the possibility of reinstatement 
following unfair d ismissal. There are other 4 items which refer to 
the additional rules for collective d ismissals. In this case, the 
indicator takes into account the existence of specific regulations, 
the requirements of additional notifications and the costs for 
collective d ismissals. 
The 8 items of the fixed -term employment include aspects 
concerning the use of this type of contract. For example, the 
indicator examines the reasons why an employer decides to use 
temporary workers. The strictness score which is  assumed, in 
such a case, is that the lowest value is assigned in the absence of 
limits about the use of temporary contracts, and  the highest 
value given only when the use is allowed in specific and  limited  
cases. The maximum duration of successive temporary contracts 
and  the restrictions on the number of renewals are other two 
issues considered in this section. The temporary work agency 
contracts play a key role in the definition of the indicator, since 
they are considered  illegal in some countries whereas there are 
no limitations in their use in other contexts.     
The most recent update of this index provides for the addition of 
three further items that were not included in the previous 
version. They take into account the maximum period  allowed 
workers to appeal against a d ismissal considered  unfair; the 
authorizations necessary for temporary work agencies; the 
requirement for the temporary work agency employees to 
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receive the same payment and working conditions as the 
permanent employees of the user firms. 
Some other issues are addressed  in the last version of the index. 
The first one is about the set of employment protection rules 
introduced by collective agreements or individual contracts. 
These may include more generous provisions than the minimum 
standard  laid  down by legislation. The new index takes this 
aspect into account and d istinguishes these further employment 
protection provisions on the basis of their features and related 
additional cost for firms. As a matter of fact, there exist some 
norms that are agreed  on between firms and workers in order to 
improve productivity, ad just wages or other working conditions 
(Venn, 2009). These rules cannot be treated  as those included in 
the law, since they are thought with the aim to maximize profits 
and  they are not imposed by third  parties (i.e. government). 
Conversely, there are cases in which what is established  by the 
collective bargaining at a sectorial, regional and  national level is 
extended to firms and workers who were not initially present in 
the agreement. This kind  of norms should  be considered  as part 
of the EPL since they limit the ability of firm to adjust their 
workforce to the market demand. 
A second important issue is represented  by the enforcement of 
the employment protection, i.e. how it works in practice (Tiecco, 
2009). This aspect plays an important role since the complexity of 
the rules, the timing and the modalities of their implementation 
can raise the firing costs significantly. In this regards, the degree 
of specialization of the courts in labor d isputes may be essential. 
Some countries have special courts (e.g. Australia, Germany, 
France, etc), others address the issues in the ord inary courts (e.g. 
Japan, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, etc), and  still others have 
special branches in the ord inary courts (e.g. Italy, Austria). In 
some countries there are the lay judges with expertise in labor 
matters, who are nominated  by employer and employee 
representatives, serving alongside professional judges. Several 
studies show that the level of specialization of the courts 
represents an important determinant of the costs and  the 
effectiveness of the enforcement. The appeals in the highly 
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specialized  courts are, on the average, faster and  fewer. At the 
same time, it is possible to observe a positive correlation between 
the degree of the courts‟ specialization and the number of 
dismissal cases (Venn, 2009).  
Some countries have pre-court d ispute resolution procedures 
thought to help parties to resolve d isputes before an official 
complaint is made. In other countries, the attempts at 
conciliation are a prerequisite before proceeding with the lawsuit 
and  in any case the court takes into account the conciliation 
efforts carried  out before making a decision. Many OECD 
countries have institutionalized  procedures that encourage the 
parties to resolve d isputes before appealing to the court. The 
revised  OECD indicator includes some of these aspects since 
they may obviously change significantly the costs faced  by firms 
in the case of d ismissal. There are several categories of workers 
excluded from protection legislation. In many cases, they 
represent a minimum number of individuals. Althou gh the 
OECD fails to take into account all these categories, Venn (2009) 
shows that the impact in the cases where exemptions are more 
significant (e.g. Italy, where the workers of smaller firms are 
governed by less restrictive rules) is limited .  
There are alternative measures of the EPL with features 
significantly d ifferent from the OECD indicator. Among the 
most widely used , mention can be made of the indicator 
introduced by Heckman and Pages (2004) or the World  Bank 
(World  Bank‟s Doing Business “Employing workers”, 2008). The 
first focuses on regulatory issues d irectly quantifiable in terms of 
costs of firms. This approach is adopted  in order to reduce the 
degree of subjectivity. They propose the measure of the d irect 
monetary cost of d ismissals of workers with permanent contracts 
for economic reasons in the OECD and Latin American 
countries. On the other hand, the World  Bank‟s ranking takes 
into account a number of labor market policy measures related  to 
the d ifficulty of hiring and firing, the firing costs and  the 
stiffness of the working hours. However, the indicator ignores 
the complexity of rules characterizing the EPL and none of the 
measures adopted  includes provisions for collective bargaining 
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or judicial decisions, as in the OECD indicator. Although these 
are methodological d ifferences, there is a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between the OECD ranking 
and these two alternative measures (Venn, 2009). 
The indices of the measurement above described  provide a 
comprehensive view of the legislative complexity regarding the 
employment protection. Furthermore, they have played a pivotal 
role in the empirical research on the effects of employment 
protection. This will be shown later.   
 
1.3 The impact of the EPL on the labor market: theoretical 
models. 
 
This paragraph examines the theoretical impact that the 
introduction of more stringent regulations on hiring and  
separation would  have in the labor market. More specifically, we 
analyze the effect that the firing cost may have on the overall 
employment. The firing cost has two dimensions. The first one is 
represented  by a transfer from the employer to the employee (i.e. 
advance notification, severance payment), the second one 
includes sort of taxes, like the red  tape costs, legal expenses and  
financial penalties to be paid  by the employer outside the job 
relationship (Garibald i, 2005). It is part of the administrative 
requirements that firms have to satisfy in the case of d ismissal.   
In the first part of this section, we propose two models. First, we 
follow Laezer (1990) and show that if wages are perfectly 
flexible, the effect of the EPL is completely neutralized , since the 
higher firing cost of firms is offset by a transfer of the same 
amount from the employee to the employer. Conversely, in the 
second model, we follow Schivardi (1999). In this case, the 
hypotheses are the following. The wage is fixed  and so the firing 
cost cannot be undone by the bargaining agreement between 
employer and employee. We show that a more stringent 
regulation is associated  with lower job flows and employment 
turnover. The effect of EPL on the overall employment is null in 
the long run. More flexible economy is more efficient, since firms 
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have a better capacity to adjust workforce. In the third  
paragraph, we provide evidence of the other theoretical 
predictions about the effect of the employment protection on the 
labor market. The final part of this section examines the 
implications of a dual context characterized  by stricter regulation 
associated  with permanent contracts and  flexibility associated 
with temporary contracts.  
 
1.3.1 The EPL with flexible wages. 
In this section we follow Lazer (1990) by discussing the effect of 
the EPL in a theoretical economy with perfect ly flexible wages. 
We assume that the EPL consists only in the firing cost. This is 
represented  by the government requirement for the firm to pay a 
severance payment in case of d ismissal. The effect of the EPL in 
this case is null, since the transfer of money from the employer to 
the employee is completely offset by the transfer of the same 
amount from the employee to the employer. Hence, the total cost 
of d ismissal does not increase and then the employment is not 
affected . 
Let us consider a two-period  labor market, where there are no 
labor unions, there is no minimum wage and the market is 
perfectly flexible. Individuals are risk neutral. Therefore, they are 
not interested  in the wage-time variations, but in the average 
wage (Garibald i, 2001).  
The contract is signed in the first period , but becomes effective in 
the second period . First, we assume that there is no compulsory 
severance payment. Defining   as the reservation wage,   the 
firm‟s productivity and  the wage paid  by the employer to the 
employee, in the equilibrium without EPL we have: 
 
         
 
The marginal productivity of the firm is equal to the worker‟s 
reservation wage. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium condition 
without EPL: the wage is constant for the entire duration of the 
job contract. 
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Fig.1 Salary offered  in the flexible regime (r: economy interest rate). 
 
Now, suppose that the government requires a compulsory 
severance payment for the d ismissal of a worker. In equilibrium 
the worker chooses to accept the job in the second period  if the 
following relationship holds: 
 
       
 
where   is the severance payment and    is the wage in the 
second period . On the other side, the firm decides to offer the job 
if:  
        
       
 
Therefore, the severance payment   increases the reservation 
wage that is now equal to:  
 
        
 
This means that the introduction of the severance payment 
makes the contract more attractive to the worker. In order to 
compensate for this, the worker p ays a fee to the firm so that the 
overall compensation remains the same. In this context, this fee 
takes the form of a lower wage for a certain period  (less than the 
W
W*
t*
W*-Q/t*
W*+rQ
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marginal product), during which the worker transfers to the firm 
the amount of the severance payment: 
 
      
 
Firms pay exactly the same cost with or without the severance 
payment and the employee receives, on average, the same wage. 
Hence, with or without the severance payment firm and  
employee behave exactly at the same manner. We may conclude 
that in an economy with flexible wages, the introduction of 
employment protection legislation has no effect on the labor 
market.  
The results obtained  are valid  if the severance payment is fully 
received  by the worker. Indeed, the presence of a third  subject 
could  lead to inefficiency. Let us suppose that   is the amount of 
the severance payment received  by the worker and    that paid 
by the firm, and assume that: 
 
     
 
We can assume that the d ifference      is paid , for example, 
by the unemployment insurance system. 
In the second period , we have: 
 
          (for worker) 
 
and: 
              (for firm) 
 
Given that  
  is the equilibrium wage, we should  have  
 
  
      
     
 
Therefore the efficiency is obtained  only for     . Since 
    , the value of labor force is higher than what the firm 
would  be willing to pay and this inefficiency leads to 
underemployment. 
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1.3.2 The EPL with fixed wages. 
In this section we follow Schivardi (1999) by assessing the effect 
that the introduction of the employment protection legislation 
would  have in the labor market in the case of fixed  wages 
(Schivardi, 1999). We distinguish two countries, country   and  
country  . The first one is characterized  by total flexibility in the 
adjustment of the workforce, in the other the firing cost is so 
high that d ismissals are not allowed. Let us suppose that in each 
country there is one firm with the same production function: 
 
                       { | } 
 
where    is the productivity which may assume the values 
      with probability   and     , respectively.    
represents the productivity during the recession whereas    
represents the productivity during the expansion.    is the labor 
input. 
Let us consider first the country  . Let us call the wage  . A 
firm maximizes its profits, once the level of productivity is 
observed. The optimal level of employment is then chosen in 
order to maximize the function: 
 
                      [           ] 
 
from which it follows that: 
 
    
 
 
  
 
    (1) 
 
Conversely, in the rigid country, the level of employment cannot 
be decided  after observing the productivity level. In this case, 
firm decides to maximize the expected  value of profits: 
 
      [           ]
      [                     ] 
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the solution in this case is given by: 
 
    
  
           
 
     (2) 
 
The value     
  represents an intermediate value between the 
value of the employment in the flexible country during the 
recession (    and  the expansion (     
From the above comparison between the employment levels of 
the two countries (1) e (2) the following results emerge. The 
average employment in the long run is the same in both the rigid  
and flexible economy. Thus, restrictions on layoffs have no effect 
on the average level of employment. This result can be explained  
as follows. In the long run the flexible economy will cross, on 
average, a fraction    of high productivity period  and a fraction 
    of low productivity. From this, we obtain the equivalence 
between (1) and  (2).  
A second consequence is related  to the variability of 
employment, which is higher in the flexible economy. Indeed, by 
definition, in the rigid  economy there is no change in 
employment, while, depending on the business cycle of the 
economy, country   records an employment variation equal to: 
 
   
     
 
 
 
Concerning the duration of unemployment, we can notice that it 
is higher in the rigid  economy. This is a consequence of the fact 
that in the rigid  economy   there is no turnover, therefore 
unemployed  workers have no possibility to find  a new job. On 
the other hand, in the flexible economy the unemployed find  a 
job during the expansion phase. Therefore, the duration of 
unemployment depends on the probability of being in 
expansion, that is equal to 
 
 
, where   is the probability that 
productivity is equal to   . 
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Finally, the flexible economy is more efficient and  this is due to a 
better capacity of firms to adjust the workforce, since they can 
use more employment during periods of high productivity. This 
can be easily checked. In the flexible economy   is chosen in 
order to maximize the profit. Let   be the profit in the flexible 
economy and    the profit in the rigid  economy, we obtain that: 
 
      
 
if  
 
       [         ]    [         ] 
 
where         
 
Let: 
              
 
and  
 
     [         ]    [         ] 
 
we have that: 
 
                       
 
          
 
 ̇            
 
 ̇                             
 
Hence,                       and  this means that profits are 
lower in the rigid  economy.   
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1.3.3 Other theoretical predictions. 
This section looks into the other theoretical predictions about the 
effects of job security provisions on the labor market. So far, the 
d iscussion has led  to the following results: first, higher 
employment protection reduces job turnover, whereas increases 
the duration of unemployment; second, restrictions on layoffs 
seem to have no effect on the employment in the long run. 
Finally, profits are lower in the more rigid  economy.  
There exists a general convergence on the effect of EPL on job 
and worker turnover as well as the duration of employment and 
unemployment. However the effect on the aggregate 
employment and unemployment is ambiguous.  
Bentolila and  Bertola (1990) propose a partial equilibrium 
analysis of labor demand with a linear ad justment cost funct ion. 
They find  that firing costs influence the more the firing policy of 
firms than their hiring policy. As a consequence the average 
long-run employment slightly increases. Alvarez and Veracierto 
(1998) obtain similar results through a general equilibrium  
model. They show that the severance payment reduces 
unemployment and have large positive effects on employment. 
The severance payment reduces layoff rates while it increases the 
job finding rate. If the former result is not surprising, the second  
seems to be less intuitive. The idea behind  this result is the 
following. The lower layoff rate increases the length of time that 
workers are expected  to remain employed. This induces them to 
search job more intensively thereby increasing the probability to 
find  a job. Conversely, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) present 
a general equilibrium model and  show that the effect of the 
d ismissal cost on employment is significantly negative. Their 
main finding is that a tax on d ismissal reduces greatly the steady 
state of employment and the average labor productivity. Using 
firm level data for the calibration of their model, they find  that a 
firing tax equal to 1 year‟s wages lowers the total employment by 
2.5% and the average productivity by 2.1%. The intuition for 
productivity result is straightforward . The d ismissal cost hinders 
the structural change of firms that use less efficiently their 
employees. The mobility of workers from contracting firms and 
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industries to the expanding ones slows down and  enact negative 
consequences for productivity and growth . Ljungqvist (2002) 
follows the same line of research and tries to explain the reason 
of the d ifferent results in Bentolila and  Bertola (1990) and 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). In order to achieve this aim, he 
proposes three alternative models of employment determination: 
a search model, a matching model and  a model with 
employment lotteries. In the first model he assumes that workers 
search for new jobs if the productivity level is smaller than the 
reservation productivity. In contrast, the unemployed workers 
choose an optimal search intensity that influences the 
unemployment spells. In this context, layoff costs make the labor 
reallocation in response to the productivity shocks more costly. 
This lowers the less frictional unemployment. In the second 
model, the matching function depends on the number of 
vacancies and unemployed workers. The surplus of a match is 
d ivided  between the worker and the firm through Nash 
bargaining. Two different bargaining assumptions are taken into 
account. The first assumption is that the worker‟s relative share 
of the match surplus is constant when the layoff cost varies. The 
second assumption allows the worker‟s share to increase with 
the layoff cost. The implications are therefore that w ith a 
constant share the result is similar as in the search model and  the 
layoff cost makes the reallocation of labor more costly. The labor 
reallocation is then reduced and the frictional unemployment is 
lower. Conversely, if the layoff costs reduce the share of the 
firms‟ match surplus, the equilibrium for firms is achieved with a 
higher unemployment. Indeed, the higher unemployment  
weakens workers‟ bargaining power  and  cuts down significantly 
the time firms are expected  to fill a vacancy and restore their 
profitability. In a model with employment lotteries, the higher 
layoff cost has a significant negative effect on employment. In 
this model, agents choose the probability of working while a 
lottery establishes which agents work. There is no frictional 
unemployment. Firms create new jobs if the expected  d iscounted  
profits are not negative. The extent of these expected  d iscounted  
profits depends negatively on the amount of firms‟ future layoff 
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taxes. This means that a higher layoff tax has a negative effect on 
the optimal choice of employment. As a consequence, the agents‟ 
return to work is lower and the probability of working is 
reduced.     
Job security provisions may also affect in a different manner the 
levels of unemployment and employment of the various 
demographic groups. Indeed, the way they are designed often 
affects d ifferently the subgroups of population. For instance, 
mention can be made of the periods of notice and the severance 
pay which increase significantly with the job tenure by raising 
the risk of layoff for persons with shorter tenure (i.e. youth and 
women) (Skedinger, 2010).  
Bertola et al (2007) investigate the impact of labor market 
institutions on the employment levels of d ifferent groups of the 
workforce. Their main findings show that stricter labor market 
regulations tend  to be associated  with lower employment levels 
among groups with a higher labor supply elasticity (i.e. youth, 
women and older workers), while it maintains high the 
employment rates for prime age men. The empirical evidence of 
the paper, based  on macroeconomic and institutional data on 26 
OECD countries for 8 five-year period  from 1960 to 1999, 
confirms the theoretical predictions, except for the older 
individuals. As a matter of fact, they find  that the employment 
protection legislation lowers the unemployment rates of the 
prime aged (i.e. 25-54) with respect to the younger workers, 
while there is no evidence of the raise of unemployment of older 
individuals. Chéron et al (2011) analyze the effect of the 
employment protection legislation by d ifferent age groups. In 
the hypothesis of a finite working life, they first investigate the 
effect of a constant firing tax over ages. This tax reduces job 
destruction for older workers more than younger ones. The 
intuition is the following. Let us suppose that a firm has to 
decide whether to d ismiss older or younger workers, ceteris 
paribus. In the first case the shorter d istance from retirement 
could  induce firms to keep the worker until he will be retired  in 
order to avoid the firing tax. In the case of younger workers, the 
value of the actual firing tax could  be less than the expected 
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future loss in keeping the worker. Therefore, firms tend to 
d ismiss the younger workers. In the hypothesis of an age-
increasing firing tax, the argumentation provided above is still 
valid . The effect therefore is similar: the job destruction rate of 
young workers is higher than that of the older ones. Chéron et al 
(2011) argue that the optimal firing tax displays a hump -shaped 
profile. It is age increasing under a certain threshold  age, above 
which it decreases. This stimulates firms to fire fewer older 
workers, or postpone their d ismissal, since the expected  firing 
cost is lower in the future. 
 
1.3.4  Temporary versus permanent workers: the EPL at 
margin. 
The employment protection legislation reduces employees‟ 
probability to lose their job, but at the same time it lowers the 
unemployed probability to flow out from unemployment. The 
EPL is then well accepted  by the employed but not by the 
unemployed. Since the employed workers generally represent a 
greater part of the electorate, it is easy to understand the reasons 
why the EPL is d ifficult to remove or reduce once introduced 
(Garibald i, 2001). This is on the basis of the political theory of the 
EPL (Saint Paul, 1993; Saint Paul, 2000; Vindigni, Scotti, Tealdi, 
2013). The necessity to introduce into the labor market more 
flexibility occurred  from the second half of the 90s. Recently the 
economic crisis has confirmed this and  various international 
organizations (OECD, 2012) are advocating for such reforms. 
However, this need  has been satisfied in some cases leaving 
unchanged the conditions of the insider workers and increasing 
the flexibility of labor market just for the outsider workers. This 
kind  of reform is known as reform at margin. It can be justified 
by political reasons since they allow to achieve the broadest 
consensus among workers. Indeed, on one hand the insiders do 
not see their level of protection tampered  with. On the other 
hand, the outsiders –  namely youth and unemployed –  
consider this flexibility as an instrument to improve their 
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possibilities to enter the labor market, although in more 
precarious conditions.   
The last part of this section concerns the theoretical effect of 
employment protection reforms at margin. Boeri and  Garibaldi 
(2007) analyze the effect that such a reform at the margin may 
have on the employment and productivity. Let us suppose to be 
in a rigid  economy, as in the context above described , but we 
allow now firms to have a flexibility at the margin. In other 
words, they can hire or fire temporary workers (      , while 
the number of permanent employees (       remains 
unchanged. The optimal level of employment    is obtained  by: 
 
               
 
where       is  given by (2; see the previous section), while       
is equal to: 
 
{
            
 
             
                                           
 
 
The first main consequence is that the average employment   ̅ 
increases permanently. Indeed, denoted  as   the percentage of 
firms that are in favorable economic conditions and       
those in unfavorable economic conditions, we observe that: 
 
  ̅         
            
 
  
 
which says that   ̅       . This is what Boeri and  Garibaldi 
define as the honeymoon effect in employment.  
A second consequence concerns the average productivity which 
falls permanently. Indeed, it is possible to show that: 
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where we say  
 
 
   the average productivity in the reform 
context. This results is a d irect application of the law of 
d iminishing return. The idea behind  it is that expanding firms 
hire temporary workers. This additional employmen t decreases 
the marginal productivity of labor and, consequently, the 
average productivity declines. Finally, as regards the effect on 
average profits, it is observed that the reform allows firms to 
have the same average profits during unfavorable economic 
conditions whereas they are able to increase employment during 
better periods, so that they can achieve the optimal level. This 
chance is not permitted  in the rigid  context.  
In the last part of this paragraph we provide other theoretical 
predictions abou t the main effects on the labor market in a 
legislative context where the rules for temporary employment 
are liberalized  but those for permanent employment remains 
unchanged.  
Blanchard  and Landier (2001) investigate the effect of such a 
partial reform of employment protection, both theoretically and 
empirically. The main assumptions of the theoretical model are 
the following: the employment protection is considered  as layoff 
costs, that is higher for regular workers; the new entrants are 
hired  with temporary contracts and  have initially a lower 
productivity than the regular workers; should  the temporary 
worker‟s productivity raise and achieve the  level of a permanent 
worker, the firm can decide to keep him  or her in a regular job or 
to hire a new temporary worker with a lower productivity. With 
regard  to the theoretical implications, a partial reform which 
increases the d ifference between the firing costs of regular and 
temporary workers leads to a higher employee excess turnover. 
Furthermore, the decrease in the temporary firing cost reduces 
the value of temporary jobs, thus making them look the more 
like unemployment and the less like regular jobs. This increases 
the dualism in the labor market.  
In the empirical section, Blanchard  and Landier (2001) analyze 
the evolution of the labor market in France in the years between 
1980 and 2000. They focus on the development of fixed -duration 
contract that was introduced in 1979 and  was limited  in its use in 
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1982 and 1986. The introduction of temporary contracts chan ged 
completely the labor market especially for the youth. Indeed, the 
proportion of workers, aged  20-24, with permanent contracts 
drops from 85% in 1983 to 46% in 2000. The probability to move 
from temporary to permanent contract decreases, while the 
probability to remain on temporary contracts increases 
throughout the period . Finally, the probability of staying or 
becoming unemployed is not clearly identified . Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay (2001) obtain similar results. They investigate the 
effect of policies that render high the employment protection of 
permanent contracts, while trying to facilitate the use of fixed -
duration contracts. The effect may be adverse. Indeed, the 
liberalization of temporary contracts may increase both job 
creation and job destruction. The theoretical impact on the 
overall unemployment is then ambiguous. However, by 
calibrating the model on the European labor market, they show 
that the effect of job destruction is prevalent in the presence of a 
positive firing cost and  this increases unemployment. 
Interestingly, the paper shows that the nature of firm ownership  
may play a key role. In case profits are not redistributed  among 
workers (e.g. continental and southern Europe) then the preferred  
policy situation is the dual labor market, in wh ich job protection 
and temporary contracts coexist. Conversely, in case profits are 
d istributed  among workers (e.g. Anglo Saxon economies), the 
flexible labor market is the preferred  context.  
In conclusion, economic theory on the effect of employment 
protection converges on the following results: more stringent 
regulations reduce job and worker turnover, while increase the 
duration of unemployment. The effect on the aggregate 
employment seems to be, instead , ambiguous. Stricter job 
protection regulation lowers both the layoff and  hiring rates and 
this two opposing effects generally compensate each other. EPL 
may affect d ifferently the levels of employment in the various 
demographic groups. More stringent job protection provisions 
tend  to be associated  with lower employment among groups 
characterized  by higher labor supply elasticity (i.e. women and the 
youth). Furthermore, the coexistence of less (i.e. temporary) and 
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more (i.e. permanent) protected  workers in the labor market leads 
to higher employee excess turnover and labor market duality. 
However, once again no clear cut answer can be provided about 
the impact on the aggregate employment. Finally, theoretical 
results about the effect of EPL on productivity suggest that 
higher layoff cost reduces productivity since it hinders the 
structural change of firms that use less efficiently their 
employees.   
    
1.4 Empirical evidence of the EPL 
In this section we review the empirical evidence about the 
impact of employment protection on labor reallocation and 
productivity. Particularly, the first paragraph reviews the 
empirical evidence on the role that EPL plays on the labor 
market in terms of job and worker flows as well as the stock of 
employment. While the effect of EPL on  in and out flow of jobs 
seems to be clear, there is no consensus about the impact on 
unemployment. Economic theory gives no guidance on the 
effects of severance pay on unemployment rates (Laezer, 1990). 
In the second paragraph, empirical evidence on productivity is 
reviewed. Stringent regulations on hiring and firing could  affect 
the efficiency of production and productivity growth through 
several channels (OECD, 2007). By reducing the ability of firms 
to adjust their workforce to the exogenous shocks of demand 
and technological changes adequately and timely, the EPL may 
have d irect effects on the growth of productivity. The effects may 
also be indirect: first, the influence on the risk level of firms to 
invest in new technologies, second the investment of workers 
and firms in the human capital and  finally the incentive effects 
on worker effort.  
 
25 
 
1.4.1. Empirical evidence of the EPL effect on labor 
market. 
There is a wide literature that analyzes the impact of the 
employment protection on labor market in terms of job and 
worker flows as well as the stock of employment. 
One strand of this literature finds that the EPL effect on the 
aggregate employment and unemployment levels is not 
significant (tab.1). Nickell (1997) investigates the effect of policy 
measures on the labor market. Among other results, he argues 
that the generosity of the unemployment benefits may have an 
impact which depends on the pressure on unemployed to obtain 
work. The presence of labor unions may result in high 
unemployment in the absence of coordination with the 
employers. Labor taxes generally increase unemployment. 
Regarding the employment protection legislation and the overall 
labor market legislation, he shows that these do not seem to have 
significant implications on the average levels of unemployment. 
Jackman et al (1996) confirm this evidence. Employment 
protection reduces hirings and thus increases long term 
unemployment. But it also reduces firings and short term 
unemployment. Hence, the effect on hirings is almost 
neutralized  by the effect on firings and this shows no significant 
effect on the persistence of unemployment. Consistently with 
these results, OECD (1999) finds that the strictness of EPL has a 
residual or insignificant effect on the overall unemployment. 
Conversely, by analyzing gender and age, it is possible to 
observe that the effect on the demographic composition of the 
unemployed population appears to be significant. Indeed, the 
cross country comparison suggests that as a result of a combined 
effect a stricter EPL does not seem to have any influence on the 
aggregate of unemployment. A stricter EPL induces lower 
unemployment for adults, that is balanced by a higher 
unemployment for younger workers. With regards to 
employment, the results are similar and  confirm that higher EPL 
is associated  with higher adult employment rates and lower 
youth and female employment rates. Regarding job flows, 
stricter EPL is associated with lower turnover and, as confirmed 
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by theoretical models, unemployment spells tend  to be longer. 
As a matter of fact, with stricter EPL, fewer people become 
unemployed but the unemployed finds it more d ifficult to 
reintegrate into the labor market.  
Blanchard  and Portugal (2001) present the case of Portugal and  
the US. At the beginning of the 90s, these two economies had  for 
a long time the same unemployment rate, although operating in 
a very d ifferent labor protection legislation. Portugal has high 
EPL whereas the US is the country with the least strict regulation 
(OECD, 2013). However, although Portugal and  the US show  
similar unemployment rates, they are characterized  by two 
d ifferent labor markets as a consequence of the EPL effect on 
employment flows. Indeed, the d ifferent regulation induced in 
Portugal much lower job flows, approximately one third  of those 
registered  in the United  States, but at the same time the 
unemployment duration was three times higher. Since the 
unemployment rate is the product of these two quantities, the 
combined effect leads to a similar unemployment rate. This 
provides clear evidence of the ambiguous effect of the EPL on 
employment. Bassanini and  Duval (2006) achieve similar results. 
By analyzing the impact of structural policies and institutions on 
aggregate unemployment, they find  no significant impact of 
EPL. Differently from what was observed by the OECD (1999), 
they suggest that this insignificant coefficient may be the result 
of two opposite effects: an upward  pressure on unemployment 
due to the EPL on the regular contracts and  a downward  
pressure on temporary contracts. Although the main objective of 
their paper is to investigate the effect of product market 
competition on unemployment and wages, Griffith et al. (2006) 
obtain interesting results concerning the relationship  between 
labor market regulations and unemployment: taxes and 
unemployment benefits affect positively the unemployment, 
while no significant effect is related  to the job protection 
provisions.  
Using an international macro panel data on OECD countr ies, 
Allard  et al (2007) find  no significant effect on the overall 
employment by provid ing a separate analysis of the EPL impact 
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on insiders and outsiders. Consistently with the theoretical 
prediction and the empirical results of Bertola et al (2007), they  
observe a d ifferent impact on the employment levels of the 
worker groups. This can be the result of the effects of EPL on the 
human capital. More specifically, by raising the time spent 
without job for outsiders (i.e. women and youth), the EPL causes 
a net drop  in their human capital increasing the relative 
unemployment rates. Furthermore, this human capital loss has 
also a clear negative effect on productivity. Indeed, the effect on 
the depreciation of the outsiders‟ human capital persists 
throughout their career reducing their later productivity.  
Baccaro et al (2007) estimate a country-level dynamic model with 
the unemployment rate as a function of a series of labor market 
institutions (i.e. employment protection, benefit replacement rate, 
benefit duration, the change in union density, bargaining coordination, 
the tax wedge) and  macroeconomic variables. They adopt the EPL 
index elaborated  by the OECD. Employment protection does not 
seem to be associated with higher unemployment rates. Its 
coefficient varies in sign across specifications, but it is 
statistically insignificant. The same results emerge from benefit 
employment rates, tax wedge and wage coordination, whereas 
there is a positive association between unemployment and union 
density. Finally, Rovelli et al (2008) assess the effect of labor 
market policies on the employment outcomes across EU 
countries and find  that EPL does not seem to influence the 
employment rates. Its contribution is either not significant or 
weakly positive. 
Although most of the empirical studies confirm the absence of a 
significant effect of the EPL on employment, there are a number 
of studies which seem to indicate the presence of a possible effect  
(tab.2). 
Laezer (1990) examines data from 22 countries, including United  
States and most of Europe, in the years between 1956 and 1984. 
He finds a significant effect of severance pay on the labor 
market. Although not completely consistent, his estimates 
suggest that an increase of severance pay substantially lowers 
the number of jobs in the economy. This is in line with the 
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previous results. However this would  raise the unemployment 
rate and reduce the employment rate. More specifically, he finds 
that moving from a no-severance pay condition to three months 
of required  severance pay to employees would  reduce in the US 
the employment rate by 1 percent. At the same time, this 
increases the unemployment rate by 5.5 percent. The burden of 
this situation would  be on the youth. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence suggests that severance pay turns full time jobs into 
part-time ones, permanent workers to temporary workers. Since 
part-timers and temporary workers are exempted  from 
severance pay, employers tend  to substitute full time and 
permanent workers with part-timers and temps. Di Tella et al 
(1998), Heckman and Pages (2000) and Addison and Teixeira 
(2005) strictly refer to this paper.  
Using survey data on the hiring and firing restriction for 21 
OECD countries during the period  1984-1990, Di Tella et al 
(1998) extend the contributions of Laezer (1990) and assess the 
effect of flexibility on the labor market of the countries 
mentioned . The sign of the relationship  between flexibility and 
employment rate is significantly positive. Similarly, the effect of 
flexibility on the labor market participation is positive and both  
of these results are larger in the female labor market in the short 
run. The long-run effect seems instead  similar by gender. The 
paper also finds that lower labor market regulations reduce the 
unemployment rates and the share of long-term unemployed. 
Heckman and Pages (2000) analyze the impact of EPL in Latin 
American labor markets. Their results confirm those mentioned 
above about the effect on job and worker flows. Stricter job 
protection norms reduce job flows in and out of employment. 
The probability of exiting employment is lower, but at the same 
time the probability to find  a job is lower. This leads to insecurity 
among workers who insist to maintain the existing rules. With 
regards to the impact on employment, their findings are similar 
to Laezer (1990). They show that EPL affects negatively the level 
of employment. This is confirmed in all specifications except for 
females. On the other hand the impact on unemployment rates is 
positive and it seems to be much larger for women and the youth 
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but smaller in developing countries. Finally, Addison and  
Teixeira (2005) investigate the effect of severance pay on 
employment and unemployment by extending the sample 
period  of Laezer‟s (1990) dataset. They confirm Laezer‟s results 
on unemployment rate, while those concerning the employment 
rate, long-term unemployment rate and labor force participation 
rate seem to d isappear when they control for country dummies.  
Scarpetta (1996) confirms the existence of a significant EPL 
impact. He assesses the role of labor market policies and 
institutional settings on unemployment. Regarding the effect of 
employment protection regulations, he finds out that it raises 
unemployment and non-employment rates. The non-
employment rate is the sum of unemployed  workers and  
inactive individuals d ivided  by the total working age 
population. Stronger positive effects are observed on  the youth 
and long term unemployment. In order to evaluate the impact of 
the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) on the d isabled 
employees‟ labor outcomes, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find  a 
negative relationship  between stricter job protection and 
employment level. In 1994 ADA demanded from employers with 
fifteen or more employees to improve working conditions of 
d isabled  employees (e.g. availability of wheel chair access and special 
equipment for disabled workers), avoid ing any form of 
d iscrimination in terms of job opportunities (i.e. wages, hiring, 
separation). ADA increases the cost of hiring d isabled  workers, 
while its effect on the d isabled  separations seems to be residual. 
The aggregate effect on the overall employment levels is then 
negative. Kugler et al (2003) assess the effect of the 1997 labor 
market reform in Spain. This reform reduced the unfair d ismissal 
cost of permanent employees for the following social categories: 
workers under 30 and  over 45 years of age, the long-term 
unemployed, women under-represented  in their occupation and 
d isabled workers. They find  that the reform affected  both hiring 
and d ismissal, as theory suggests. But in the case of older men 
the effect on hirings is offset by the effect on firings, and  this 
leads to insignificant net changes in the permanent employment. 
Conversely, in the case of the youth, the effect on d ismissal 
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seems to be irrelevant. This therefore makes the overall effect on 
the permanent employment of young workers positive. Botero et 
al (2004) investigate the regulation of labor market in 85 
countries, by testing the valid ity of three broad theories: the 
efficiency theory, the political power theory, and  the legal 
theory. With regard  to the implications of stricter employment 
protection, their results confirm that it leads to higher 
unemployment, especially for the youth. Furthermore, they find 
that in such a legislative context lower male participation in the 
labor force is observed. Similarly, Kahn (2007) finds that there is 
a positive relation between the strictness of EPL and the youth, 
female and immigrant unemployment rates. Using data of 
International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), from 1994-1998 for 
several countries, he observes that strict EPL protracts the 
permanent jobs of prime age men, while leaving the other 
groups out of work or shifting among temp orary jobs for a long 
time. Fiavolà and Schneider (2008) analyze the role of labor 
market institutions by explaining the d ifferences among labor 
market developments in the European countries, particularly the 
new European Union member countries. Adopting the OECD 
EPL indicator, they take into account four models with the 
following variables as the outcome: unemployment rate, long-
term unemployment, employment rate and activity rate. There is 
no evidence of a significant effect of the EPL on the 
unemployment rate and  the long-term unemployment. On the 
other hand, the third  and the fourth model show that higher job 
protection regulation tends to lower both the employment and 
activity rates. Finally, Sà (2008) evaluates the effect of 
employment protection legislation on the native and immigrant 
labor markets. Immigrants are generally characterized  by a less 
awareness of the regulations and their rights. This may give 
them a competitive advantage in the labor market since 
employers may find  them more attractive. Using data on some 
OECD countries over the period  1995 -2005 and the OECD EPL 
indicator, they find  that this conclusion is valid . Stricter 
regulation reduces the employment rates of natives while 
increases the employment rates of immigrants. The effect is 
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higher for immigrants who have spent longer time in the 
country. This seems to be a paradox, considering the results for 
natives. Indeed, the awareness of rights increases over time, 
making immigrants with a longer permanence seem like natives. 
But longer permanence improves immigrants‟ productivity and 
this effect seems to dominate.      
There are a few authors who estimate a positive effect on 
employment. Using establishment level data collected  by the 
Census Bureau, Autor et al (2007) explore the impact of the 
adoption of wrongful discharge protection by US state courts 
during the period  1970-1990. This law introduced some 
exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. Employers were 
prohibited  to fire workers violating the public policy and 
without a good cause. There are three main area of research: that 
regarding the effect on employment fluctuations, that concerning 
the effect on employment levels and  that relative to the impact 
on productivity. The effect on employment fluctuations is in line 
with the expected  theoretical results: the employment protection 
lowers the flows (by 5-12%). The total employment increases by 
4.8 to 7.8 log points after the introduction of the exception. But 
this result is considered anomalous by the same authors. The 
effect on productivity will be discussed  in the next paragraph.  
 
1.4.2 The empirical evidence of the EPL effect on 
productivity. 
 
In the previous paragraphs we have already observed theoretical 
results and  some empirical evidences on the effect of the 
employment protection legislation on productivity. This issue 
will be dealt with in depth in this paragraph. Stringent 
regulation on hiring and firing could  affect the efficiency of 
production and productivity growth through several channels 
(OECD, 2007). By reducing firms‟ ability to respond to the 
exogenous shocks of demand and technological changes 
adequately and timely, the EPL may have d irect effects on the 
growth of productivity (tab.3). The effects may also be indirect 
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(tab.4): first, the influence on the risk level of firms to invest in 
new technologies, second the investment of workers and firms in 
the human capital, third  the incentive effects on worker effort.  
The theoretical model and  the empirical results presented  in 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) show a negative effect of the 
employment protection legislation on productivity. More 
specifically, they find  that a firing tax which is equivalent to 1 
year‟s wage lowers the average productivity by 2.1%. The 
conclusion is straightforward . The d ismissal cost hinders the 
structural change of firms that use less efficiently their 
employees. The mobility of workers from contracting firms and 
industries to the expanding ones slows down, with negative 
consequences for productivity and growth. Scarpetta et al (2002) 
assess the influence of policy institutions on the d ifferences in 
productivity observed across 19 OECD countries over the period  
1984-1998. The results confirm the negative impact of EPL on 
productivity only in countries with an  intermediate degree of 
centralisation/ coordination in wage bargaining, since it raises 
the adjustment cost of the workforce and thus hinders  
technology adoption. Similarly, Micco and Pages  (2004) verify 
that the EPL has implications on the productivity of areas where 
frequent workforce adjustments are required . In this paper, a 
negative relationship between layoff costs and  the level of the 
labor productivity is observed, although results seem to depend 
on the inclusion of a country (i.e. Nigeria) in the sample. The pro-
workers reforms may have an adverse effect, leading to lower 
levels of investment, employment, productivity and output. 
Furthermore, they may also increase the informal sector activity. 
These results emerge from Besley et al (2004) in which  the effect 
of labor market regulation on the development of manufacturing 
firms in India in the period  1958-1992 is considered .  
Using establishment level data for US from 1970 to 1999 Autor et 
al (2007) evaluate the empirical link between d ismissal costs  and  
productivity. During that period , state courts in the US adopted  
stricter job security provisions. The main finding of the paper is 
the significantly negative effect on the total factor productivity 
(TFP), that is stronger in the short run. It reaches its peak three 
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years after the introduction of the stricter norms. A negative EPL 
effect on productivity is confirmed in Bassanini and  Venn (2007). 
Using firm level data they analyze the effect of the employment 
protection legislation, minimum wages, parental leave and 
unemployment benefits on productivity. Regarding the EPL, 
they find  that norms on regular contracts induce a small but 
significantly negative effect on the growth of aggregate 
productivity. Particularly by using the OECD-EPL indicator, 
with a scale from 1 (i.e. the least stringent) to 6 (i.e. the most 
stringent), they show that a 1-point increase in the stringency of 
regulation produces a 0.04 percentage point reduction of the 
TFP. Bassanini et al (2008) propose an analysis of the EPL across 
industries. Although EPL is defined  at an aggregate level, using 
data at the industry level from 1982 to 2003 and a d ifference-in-
d ifference approach, they find  that the EPL effect on 
productivity is negative but the extent varies significantly across 
industries. It is larger in the industries where regulations are 
more likely to be binding, i.e. sectors that rely on the adjustment 
of the workforce through layoffs rather than in sectors where 
turnover and the internal labor market are prominent.  
Finally, the same results are in Dougherty et al (2011). Using 
plant-level data between 1998-99 and 2007-08, they assess the 
impact of employment protection legislation on productivity in 
India. A d ifference in d ifference approach is adopted  in order to 
take into account the level of stringency in the labor market 
across Indian states and the industry level labor intensity. Their 
main findings are that there is a significantly positive correlation 
between lower labor regulation and multifactor productivity. But 
this result is confirmed only in the industries where labor 
intensity is higher, otherwise it is close to zero. Similar results 
emerge from the labor productivity. 
A strand of the empirical literature analyze the several indirect 
channels through which the EPL may affect productivity.   
An example is provided by the indirect influence that EPL may 
exert on firms‟ risk level in terms of investment in new 
technologies. Saint-Paul (2002) develop a model to analyze the 
effect of labor market stringency on incentives for R&D and  
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international specialization. In a rigid  labor market firms tend to 
produce mature goods, i.e. products with a steady demand. In a 
low firing cost country, firms are more propensive to invest in 
producing new goods that will be also produced in the high 
firing cost country only when they have reached a more mature 
stage. In other words, the flexible economies tend  to invest more 
in R&D, whereas rigid  economies tend  to invest more mature 
innovation. The authors argue that this seems to be at the basis 
of the d ifferent propensity to invest in new technology between 
Europe and  the US. Similarly, Bartelsman et al. (2004) show that 
the effect of EPL on the firms‟ capacity to innovate and adopt 
new technologies may depend on the characteristics of th e sector 
in which they operate. In sectors where technology plays a minor 
role, EPL lowers the incentives to innovate. In sectors where 
firms need to innovate, some distinctions are necessary. If firms 
follow the same technology process, it is easier to in vest in the 
internal labor force and thus the effect of EPL may be lower. 
Differently, if firms need to change continuously their 
technology by shifting in the kind  of human capital required , 
then the EPL effect may be significantly higher.  
But EPL may also have an impact on worker effort. Ichino and  
Riphahan (2005) show that stringent rules have a negative effect 
on workers and consequently on productivity. By analyzing data 
of 800 white collar workers of a prominent bank operating in 
Italy, they observe workers‟ absenteeism during the three month 
probation period , in which time they could  be fired  at will and 
after when they are fully protected  against firing. They show that 
the number of days of absence increase significantly once 
workers are fully protected . In a subsequent study, Arai et al 
(2003) find  a negative relation between the share of temporary 
workers and the sick rate in a panel of 10,000 non -agricultural 
private establishments in Sweden, during the period  1989-1999. 
Similarly, Engellandt et al. (2003) observe the temporary (i.e. less 
protected) workers‟ effort with respect to permanent (i.e. more 
protected) workers. Using the Swiss Labor Force Survey during 
the period  1996-2001, they analyze the unpaid  overtime hours 
and the absence rate. The main findings are the following. 
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Temporary workers are more likely to work unpaid  overtime 
hours than permanent workers and this testifies higher effort by 
this type of worker. Conversely, they do not find  any significant 
d ifference in the absence rate between protected  and 
unprotected  workers.  
Another empirical contribution in this d irection is given in 
Lindbeck et al (2006). They provide evidence of the effect of the 
employment protection legislation on the worker effort and  
more specifically on absenteeism. The 2001 Swedish job security 
reform reduced the stringency level for firms with less than ten 
employees and the main findings of the paper suggest that this 
reduction lowers significantly absenteeism as a result of sickness 
by around 0.25 days per year per employee. Four effects may be 
considered  the causes of this result: first, firms may fire more 
easily workers with high absence; second, workers may prefer to 
move voluntarily toward  bigger firms (i.e. exempted by the law 
reform); third , firms may reduce the attention in hiring decision 
and this may increase the probability to hire workers with high 
absence; finally, workers in small firms tend to reduce their 
absence since the risk to be fired  is higher. The authors show that 
this last effect is quantitatively the most important (half of the 
total). Olsson (2007) investigates the same effect obtaining similar 
results.   
Bradley et al. (2012) investigate the link between the contract 
type and absenteeism in the public sector. Using a large 2001-
2004 dataset containing approximately 180,000 public sector 
workers in Australia, they compare temporary and permanent 
worker behavior. The main findings confirm the previous 
results. More protected  workers show higher absence rates, even 
though their estimates are smaller than those observed in the 
previous studies. Furthermore, the workplace incentives, such as 
the possibility to convert from temporary in permanent 
contracts, play a prominent role and  seems to reduce the absence 
rate.    
Dolado et al (2008) evaluate the effect of the extended use of 
temporary contracts in Spain on productivity, both theoretically 
and empirically. In the theoretical model they show tha t 
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temporary workers provide higher effort if they perceive that the 
conversion rate of fixed -term into permanent contracts is high. 
Using firm-level data during the period  1991-2005, they regress 
TFP with respect to the share of temporary employees and the 
conversion rate. Empirical evidence of the theoretical predictions 
is obtained . Indeed, firms with a larger share of temporary 
workers result less productive and the estimated  effect of the 
conversion rate on TFP is significantly positive.   
However, there could  be some EPL effects which may counteract 
the negative effects so far described. Let us think about the 
positive impact on firms and workers in terms of investment in 
human capital. Stringent regulation safeguarding the long -term 
employment relationship may increase workers‟ effort, making 
firms and workers more likely to invest in human capital. Belot, 
Boon and van Ours (2007) develop a theoretical model and  
analyze the trade-off between productivity gains and costs. They 
show that the welfare, defined  as the sum of the utilities of firm 
and worker, is strictly increasing with respect to the cost of 
firing, but below a threshold . This threshold , which represents 
the social optimal firing cost, is strictly larger than zero.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
 
This paper has covered  the main literature on the effect of 
employment protection legislation on the labor market, assessing 
what economic theory predicts and  what is observed through the 
empirical analysis. Particularly, we have examined the 
relationship between the EPL and  the stock of employment, 
worker flows to and from unemployment, the duration of 
unemployment and productivity. 
Theoretical and  empirical research seem to converge on the 
following results: more stringent regulations reduce personnel 
turnover and job reallocation, while they increase the duration of 
unemployment. Conversely, the effect on the aggregate 
employment and unemployment is hard  to grasp. Indeed, by 
lowering both the layoff and  hiring rates the aggregate effect on 
37 
 
employment seems to be ambiguous. However, most of the 
studies confirm a null or negative effects, whereas there are just a 
few authors who estimate a positive effect. Finally, we analyze 
the effect of legislative contexts which leave unchanged the 
conditions of the insider workers while increase the flexibility of 
labor market just for the outsider workers. This leads to higher 
employee excess turnover and labor market duality. 
By reducing firms‟ ability to respond to the exogenous shocks of 
demand and technological changes adequately and timely, the 
EPL may have d irect effects on the growth of productivity. But it 
may also affect productivity indirectly, by influencing the risk 
level of firms to invest in new technologies, the investment of 
workers and firms in the human capital and  the incentive effects 
on worker effort. All in all, the evidence shows a negative effect 
of the employment protection legislation on productivity, since it 
may hinder the structural change of firms that use less efficiently 
their employees. In addition EPL may exert a negative effect by 
lowering worker effort. Conversely, stringent regulation 
safeguarding the long-term employment relationship may 
improve work intensity, making firms and workers more likely 
to invest in human capital with a consequent p ositive effect on  
the productivity. 
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Tab.1 Insignificant EPL effect on the aggregate employment and unemployment 
Paper Data/Sample Period Main Findings
Nickell (1997) 20 OECD countries 1983-88 and 1989-1994
No significant EPL effect on the 
average levels of unemployment
Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1996) 20 OECD countries 1983-88 and 1989-1994
EPL reduces hirings and 
separations. No significant effect on 
the aggregate unemployment
OECD (1999)
OECD countries (sample size 
between 16 and 21)
1985-1990 and 1992-1997
No significant EPL effect on the 
average levels of unemployment. 
Stricter EPL induces lower 
unemployment for adults, but 
higher for the youth
Blanchard and Portugal (2001)
Establishment level data for 
Portugal and the US
1983-1995
EPL reduces job flows but increases 
the unemployment duration. No 
significant effect on unemployment 
rate.
Bassanini and Duval (2006) 20 OECD countries 1982-2003
EPL on regular contracts exerts an 
upward pressure on 
unemployment, while EPL on 
temporary contracts exerts a 
downward pressure on 
unemployment. No significant EPL 
effect on aggregate unemployment.
Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2006) 14 OECD countries 1986-2000.
No significant effect of EPL on 
unemployment
Allard and Lindert (2007) 21 OECD countries 1978-2001
EPL increases the unemployment 
rate of women and the youth. No 
significant effect on the aggregate 
employment.
Baccaro and Rei (2007)
18 OECD countries 1960-1998.
No significant effect of EPL on 
unemployment
Rovelli and Bruno (2008) 27 OECD countries 2000-2005
No significant or weakly positive 
effect of EPL on employment rates
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Tab.2 Significant EPL effect on the aggregate employment and unemployment 
Paper Data/Sample Period Main Findings
Laezer (1990)
22 Countries (including the US, 
Canada, most of Europe, Israel, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand)
1956-1984
EPL lowers the number of jobs, 
raises the unemployment rate and 
reduces the employment rate.
Scarpetta (1996)
OECD countries (sample size 
between 15 and 17)
1983-1993
EPL raises unemployment and non-
employment rates
Di Tella and MacCulloch (1999)
21 OECD countries 1984-1990
Lower EPL raises employment rate; 
the effect is larger for females and in 
the short run. 
Heckman and Pages (2000)
Sample of OECD and Latin 
American Countries (sample size 
between 36 and 43 countries)
1990-1999
EPL reduces the in and out flows of 
job and affects negatively the level 
of employment
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001)
Current Population Surveys (USA)
1988-1997
EPL affects negatively the overall 
employment.
Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003)
Spanish Labor Force Survey
1987-2000
EPL does not affect the level of 
employment of older workers, 
while it reduces significantly in case 
of the youth
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004)
Sample of 85 countries
1928-1995
EPL raises unemployment , 
especially for the youth.
Addison and Teixeira (2005)
20 OECD countries
1970-1993
EPL raises the unemployment rate. 
No significant effect on 
employment rate, long-term 
unemployment rate and labor force 
participation rate
Kahn (2007)
International Adult Literacy 
Surveys
1994-1998
EPL increases the youth, female and 
immigrant unemployment rates.
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2007)
26 OECD countries 1960-1999
EPL lowers the unemployment 
rates of prime aged with respect to 
the younger. No effect on the 
unemployment rate of older 
individuals
Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007)
Establishment-level data from 
Census Bureau 1970-1990
EPL lowers job flows and increases 
the total level of employment 
Fiavolà and Schneider (2008) 17 European countries 1999-2004
No significant EPL effect on the 
unemployment rate and long-term 
unemployment. EPL lowers both 
the employment and activity rates.
Sà (2008) 25 EU member States 1985-2005
EPL reduces the employment rates 
of natives while increases the 
employment rate of immigrants.
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Tab.3 Direct EPL effect on productivity
Paper Data/Sample Period Main Findings
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
Longitudinal Research data for U.S. 1972-1977
Negative effect of EPL on 
productivity
Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002) 
19 OECD countries 1984-1998
Negative effect of EPL on 
productivity in countries with an 
intermediate degree of 
centralisation/coordination
Micco and Pages (2004)
United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization 
(UNIDO, 2002) - sample size 
between 65-69 countries
1985-1995
Negative effect of EPL on 
productivity. Results seem to 
depend on the inclusion of a 
country in the sample
Besley and Burgess (2004)
Panel dataset on Indian states 1958-1992
EPL leads to lower levels of 
investment, employment, 
productivity and output. It also 
increases the informal sector.
Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007)
Establishment level data for US 1970-1999
Negative effect of EPL on TFP in the 
short run
Bassanini and Venn (2007)
11 OECD countries 1982-2003
Negative effect of EPL on 
productivity: The extent of this 
effect varies significantly across 
industries.
Dougherty, Frisancho Robles and Krishna (2011)
Plant level data for India 1998-99 and 2007-08
Negative effect of EPL on 
productivity in the industries with 
higher labor intensity
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Tab.4 Indirect EPL effect on productivity
Paper Data/Sample Period Main Findings
Saint-Paul (2002)
Arai and Thoursie (2003)
Panel of 10,000 establishments in 
non-agricultural private sector in 
Sweden
1989-1999
Negative relationship between the 
share of temporary workers and the 
sick rate
Engellandt and Riphahan (2003) Swiss Labor Force Survey 1996-2001
Temporary workers are more likely 
to work unpaid overtime hourse 
than permanent workers. No 
significant difference in the absence 
rate
Bartelsman, Bassanini, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Scarpetta and Schank (2004)
Macro and sectoral data for 18 
OECD countries. Firm level data for 
US and Germany
1984-1998 for OECd countries. 
1999-2003 for US. 1993 for West 
Germany and 1996 for East 
Germany.
In low-tech sectors EPL reduces the 
incentives to innovate; EPL effect is 
higher if firms need to change 
continuously their technology
Ichino and Riphahan (2005)
Panel of 800 white collar workers of 
a bank in Italy
1993-1995
Number of days of absence increase 
for fully protected workers.
Lindbeck, Palme and Persson (2006)
Panel data containing information 
on all individuals
permanently living in Sweden
1992-2002
Positive association between the 
reduction of EPL and sickness 
absence
Olsson (2007)
Panel of Swedish establishments in 
the non-agricultural private sector
1994-2001
Positive association between the 
reduction of EPL and sickness 
absence. The extent of the EPL 
effect is lower than in Lindbeck 
(2006)
Dolado and Stucchi (2008) Firm level data for Spain 1991-2005
Firms with a large share of 
temporary employees result less 
productive. The effect of the 
perceived conversion rate from 
temporary to permanent has a 
positive effect on TFP
Okudaria, Takizawa and Tsuru (2011)
The Basic Survey of Japanese 
Business Structure and Activities
1994-2002
Strict enforcement of employment 
protection by courts may reduce 
the TFP and labor productivity
Bradley, Green and Leeves (2012)
Panel of 180,000 public sector 
workers in Australia
2001-2004
More protected workers show 
higher absence rate. The workplace 
incentives reduce the absence rate
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
The statistical enhancement of administrative data sources has 
played a pivotal role in the analysis of the labor market  in the 
last decades. They permit us to obtain a clearer picture of the 
reality than the common surveys. In so doing, they represent a 
cognitive instrument capable to support the decision-making  
strategies adequately and timely.  
This PhD thesis provides two empirical case studies entirely 
based  on the main Italian administrative data sources.  
In the first case study, we investigate the impact of employment 
protection (EP) on the composition of the workforce and worker 
turnover.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main existing literature 
about the effect of EP on labor market, both theoretically and 
empirically. Particularly, we have examined the relationship 
between the EP and the stock of employment, worker flows to 
and from unemployment, the duration of unemployment and 
the productivity. Theoretical and  empirical research seem to 
converge on the following results: more stringent regulations 
reduce personnel turnover and job reallocation, while they 
increase the duration of unemployment. The effect on the 
aggregate employment is instead  ambiguous. We also 
investigate the effect of legislative contexts which leave 
unchanged the conditions of the insider workers and increase the 
flexibility of labor market just for the outsider workers. These 
contexts lead  to higher employee excess turnover and labor 
market duality.  
Finally, the evidence shows a negative effect of EP on 
productivity, since it reduces firms‟ ability to respond to the 
exogenous shock of demand and technological changes 
adequately.  
In Chapter 2 (co-authored  with Alexander Hijzen and Stefano 
Scarpetta), we follow this line of investigation by analysing the 
impact of employment protection on the composition of the 
workforce and worker turnover. Using a unique firm-level 
administrative dataset for Italy, we adopt a regression 
d iscontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the variation in 
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employment protection provisions in Italy between firms below 
15 employees and those above 15 employees.  
We justify the use of the RDD approach through three d ifferent 
tests. First, we show that firm -size density is actually continuous 
around the threshold , as proposed in McCrary (2008). Second, 
we follow Schivardi and  Torrini (2008) and assess whether firms 
just below and above the threshold  d iffer in their propensity to 
grow. Finally, we conduct a series of balancing tests to 
investigate to what extent firms just above and below the 
threshold  d iffer in terms of the observable characteristics.  
Our RDD estimates suggest that EP increases worker 
reallocation, suggesting that EP tend to reduce rather to increase 
worker security. This can be explained  by the fact that firms 
facing more stringent EP make a greater use of workers on fixed -
term contracts. Indeed, the incidence of temporary work is 2-2.5 
percentage points higher in larger firms. There is also evidence 
that EP reduces labor productivity. This effect is to an important 
extent due to the impact of EP on worker reallocation and the  
incidence of temporary work. 
The second case study, analysed  in Chapter 3, provides a further 
example of the use of administrative data for statistical purposes. 
Using a novel matched employer-employee administrative 
dataset, we investigate the effect of the final graduation mark on 
the graduates‟ probability to be hired by firms. By evaluating 
employment contracts on the basis of their expected  duration, 
we estimate multilevel logit and  multilevel ordered  logit models 
to take into account the clustered  structure of the data and the 
nature of the response variables.  
Using a random intercept and  a random slope specifications, we 
find  the existence of a non-trivial effect of the graduation mark 
on the probability to be hired , even after controlling for the 
problem of selection. Specifically, the effect is non -monotonic: it 
is positive below a certain threshold , and  it becomes negative 
afterwards. In case of permanent contracts, the effect of the 
graduation mark is not significant, while the major plays a key 
role.      
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In conclusion, we believe that, further to  these resu lts, this PhD 
thesis provides an interesting contribution to the development 
and enhancement of administrative data, especially for Italy. 
Future studies on the evaluation of public policy impact on both 
the labor market and  the educational system could  not be carried 
out without this type of data . 
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